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1 Introduction
Understanding the effects of market frictions on pricing and trading is a long-standing
topic of interest in financial economics. The market microstructure literature focuses
on informational frictions and liquidity-provision frictions (e.g., Kyle 1985, Stoll 1978,
Grossman and Miller 1998). In contrast, the consumption-based asset pricing litera-
ture studies how various frictions affect risk-sharing across investors and, thus, affect
interest rates, stock-price volatility, and the market price-of-risk.1 This paper investi-
gates the asset-pricing effects of strategic investor behavior with price-impact frictions
on continuous-time stock-price dynamics and interest rates.
Much of our modeling approach is standard. A finite number of risk-averse in-
vestors with time-separable utility receive individual income over time and trade a
stock that pays exogenous continuous dividends and a money market account. Con-
sumption and trading decisions occur in continuous time over a finite time horizon. In-
vestors trade due to initial stock-holding endowment imbalances. The key innovation
in our model is that investors are strategic with respect to the perceived price-impact
of their asset holdings and trades. Our main theorem provides the Nash equilibrium
stock-price process and equilibrium interest rate with price-impact via solutions to a
system of ODEs.
Our main application shows that price-impact in our Nash equilibrium model has
material effects on the equilibrium interest rate and stock-price process relative to
both the analogous competitive price-taking Radner equilibrium (with unspanned
income shocks and no price-impact) and the analogous Pareto-efficient equilibrium
(with spanned income shocks and without price-impact). More specifically, taking the
Pareto-efficient equilibrium model as a baseline, price-impact in our Nash equilibrium
model magnifies risk-sharing distortions and, as a result, can simultaneously lower the
1Previous research shows that model incompleteness and consequent non-efficient risk-sharing
equilibria can arise from several channels including: (i) Unspanned labor income as in the continuous-
time Radner models in Christensen, Larsen, and Munk (2012), Zˇitkovic´ (2012), Christensen and
Larsen (2014), Choi and Larsen (2015), Kardaras, Xing, and Zˇitkovic´ (2015), Larsen and Sae-Sue
(2016), and and Zˇitkovic´ (2020). (ii) Limited stock-market participation and trading constraints
as in the continuous-time Radner models in Basak and Cuoco (1998) and Hugonnier (2012). (iii)
Transaction costs and quadratic penalties as in the Radner models in Heaton and Lucas (1992,
1996), Vayanos and Vila (1999), Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2016), Bouchard, Fukasawa, Herdegen,
and Muhle-Karbe (2018), and Weston (2018). (iv) Trading targets as in the continuous-time Nash
models in Brunnermeier and Petersen (2005), Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2016), and Choi, Larsen,
and Seppi (2020). (v) Price-impact as in the discrete-time Nash model in Vayanos (1999) and the
continuous-time Nash models in Basak (1996, 1997).
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interest rate, increase stock-price volatility, and, to a lesser extent, increase the equity
premium. Therefore, price-impact can simultaneously help resolve the risk-free rate
puzzle of Weil (1989), the volatility puzzle of LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller
(1981), and marginally affects with the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott
(1985). To the best of our knowledge, it is a new insight that price-impact can matter
for these asset-pricing puzzles.
A variety of other approaches have been proposed to resolve the three asset-pricing
puzzles: (i) Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and variations including Storeslet-
ten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007, 2008) and Krueger and Lustig (2010) use perma-
nent idiosyncratic income shocks to resolve the three asset-pricing puzzles. However,
Cochrane (2005, p.478-9) argues that high levels of risk aversion are still needed to
explain the equity premium puzzle in Constantinides and Duffie (1996). Furthermore,
Cochrane (2008, p.310) argues that the continuous-time limiting model of Constan-
tinides and Duffie (1996) requires jumps to explain the puzzles.2 In contrast to
approach (i), our price-impact equilibrium model has modest levels of risk aversion
and no jumps. In particular, we use correlated arithmetic Brownian motions to gen-
erate exogenous stock dividends and strategic investor idiosyncratic income shocks.3
(ii) In a representative agent framework, Constantinides (1990) uses an internal habit
process and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) use an external habit process to explain
the puzzles. (iii) Bansal and Yaron (2004) combine long-run consumption risk and
an Epstein-Zin representative agent to explain the puzzles. (iv) Barro (2006) and the
extension to an Epstein-Zin representative agent in Wachter (2013) use rare disasters
based on jump processes to resolve the puzzles. In contrast to approaches (ii)-(iv),
our investors’ utilities are time-additive separable exponential utility functions over
continuous-time consumption rate processes. Furthermore, the models in approaches
(ii)-(iv) are based on representative-agent frameworks in which the underlying model
is effectively complete. However, our model incorporates unspanned income shocks
and price-impact. Of the models in (ii)-(iv), our model is closest to the external
habit model in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Indeed, by switching off our model’s
2A closed-form competitive Radner equilibrium model with exponential utility investors and
dividend and income processes governed by continuous-time Le´vy jump processes which can simul-
taneously explain the three puzzles is given in Larsen and Sae-Sue (2016).
3Additionally, Judd (1985), Feldman and Gilles (1985), and Uhlig (1996) present both mathemat-
ical and interpretation issues related to models with a continuum of investors — such as Constan-
tinides and Duffie (1996) — because these models rely on average clearing conditions. In contrast,
our equilibrium model’s idiosyncratic income shocks persist at the aggregate level.
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idiosyncratic income shocks, the resulting common income shocks can be interpreted
as an external habit.
A non-standard feature in our analysis is that it is non-stationary in that the asset
pricing effects of price-impact dissipate over time. In our model, investors start with
endowed initial stock positions that are Pareto inefficient. However, due to price-
impact, investors do not trade immediately to efficient risk-sharing; rather they trade
gradually to optimize with respect to a trade-off between the benefits of improved risk-
sharing and price-impact costs of faster trading. Over time, their gradual trading has
a cumulative effect that improves risk-sharing. Thus, our analysis shows that price-
impact can have a quantitatively material short-term amplification effect on asset
pricing by prolonging risk-sharing distortions. In our model, risk sharing distortions
arise as a one-time occurrence via inequalities in initial endowed stock positions. In
richer economic settings, however, risk-sharing distortions could arise on a reoccurring
basis from stochastic habits, income shocks, heterogeneous beliefs, and asymmetric
information. In such a reoccurring-shock environment, the asset pricing amplification
effect due to price-impact could be part of asset pricing in a stationary equilibrium.
Moreover, from a calibration perspective, fundamental risk-bearing shocks can be
quantitatively smaller (i.e., more realistic) and still have material asset pricing effects
because they would be magnified by the price-impact amplification effect.
Basak (1996, 1997), Vayanos (1999, 2001), and Pritsker (2009) develop equilibrium
models with price-impact. The main differences between our model and Basak (1996,
1997) are: First, unspanned income shocks make our model incomplete. Second, we
allow for multiple traders with price-impact. Third, our price-impact equilibrium
model is time-consistent. Our analysis extends or differs from Vayanos (1999, 2001)
and Pritsker (2009) in three ways: First, we solve for an endogenous deterministic
interest rate. Among other things, this allows us to investigate the interest rate puzzle
in Weil (1989). In particular, we find that price-impact has a quantitatively larger
effect on endogenous interest rates than on the equity Sharpe Ratio. Second, our
investors start with non-Pareto efficient initial stock endowments, but then subse-
quently receive stochastic income shocks rather than stock-holding shocks. Third,
and more technically, our model is in continuous time, which makes the analysis
mathematically tractable.4
Optimal portfolio and consumption choice in models with price-impact and in
4While Vayanos (2001) allows for exogenous noise traders, all our investors are utility maximizers.
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models with transaction costs often produce similar implications for optimal investor
behavior, but there is a key difference for asset pricing. This is because all markets
must clear in equilibrium. For non-monetary models (such as ours), transaction costs
complicate the clearing condition for the real good market because transaction costs
paid by one investor must be consumed by others. The price-impact mechanism we
use is standard (see, e.g., Vayanos 1999) and does not affect any clearing conditions.
In particular, price-impact in realized prices is a form of price pressure in the prices
paid and received by buyers and sellers, rather than separate auxiliary cash flows
as, for example, transaction costs. In addition, perceived price-impact is an investor
perception whereas clearing conditions must hold for realized investor behavior.
Lastly, our analysis is related to a long-standing question in financial economics
about whether liquidity is priced (see, e.g., surveys in Easley and O’Hara (2003)
and Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2006)). One literature holds that liquidity
is priced because investors require compensation for holding securities that expose
them to higher transaction costs. For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) pro-
vide a theoretical analysis of this effect. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) also show that
systemic uncertainty in stochastic trading costs (seen as a type of random negative
dividends) can be a priced risk factor. However, another literature argues that the
quantitative asset pricing impact of liquidity is small by showing in various economic
settings that investors can reduce their trading with only small utility costs. This
counter-argument was first presented in Constantinides (1986). In contrast, our model
is not about bid-ask spreads and transactional forms of illiquidity, but rather about
the price-impact of investor asset-demand imbalances on market-clearing prices. In
particular, we show, in an analytically tractable version of a standard general equilib-
rium asset pricing framework, how persistent distortions in risk-sharing due to how
investors curtail their trading in response to price-impact has asset pricing effects.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the individual optimization
problems including the perceived price-impact functions. Section 3 contains our main
theoretical result, which provides our price-impact Nash equilibrium in closed-form.
Section 4 shows in numerical examples how price-impact can simultaneously affect
the risk-free interest rate puzzle, the equity premium puzzle, and the volatility puzzle.
Appendix B contains proofs, Appendix C outlines the analogous competitive Radner
model, and Appendix D uses the consumption-based CAPM to derive the analo-
gous Pareto-efficient equilibrium in closed-form. Appendix E discusses price-impact
4
calibration.
2 Setup
We consider a real economy model with a single perishable consumption good, which
we take as the model’s nume´raire. Trading and consumption take place continuously
for t ∈ [0, T ] for a finite time-horizon T ∈ (0,∞). The model has two traded securities:
A money market account and a stock. The money market account is in zero net
supply, and the stock supply is a constant L ∈ N. The stock pays exogenous random
dividends given by a rate process D = (Dt)t∈[0,T ] per share. The investors receive
income given by exogenous random rate processes Yi = (Yi,t)t∈[0,T ) for i ∈ {1, ..., I}
for I ∈ N. In Theorem 3.3 below, we determine endogenously the interest rate
r =
(
r(t)
)
t∈[0,T ] (a deterministic time-varying function) and the stock-price process
Sˆ = (Sˆt)t∈[0,T ] in a Nash equilibrium with price-impact.
2.1 Exogenous model inputs
Let (Bt,W1,t, ...,WI,t)t∈[0,T ] be independent one-dimensional Brownian motions start-
ing at zero with zero drifts and unit volatilities. The augmented standard Brownian
filtration is denoted by
Ft := σ(Bs,W1,s, ...,WI,s)s∈[0,t], t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.1)
An exogenous stock dividend rate process Dt has dynamics
dDt := µDdt+ σDdBt, D0 ∈ R, (2.2)
driven by the Brownian motion Bt, with a given initial value D0, a constant drift
µD, and a constant volatility coefficient σD ≥ 0. The dividend rate process plays
two roles: First, it generates a running flow of instantaneous dividends where the
associated cumulative dividend over [0, t] is
∫ t
0
Dsds for t ∈ [0, 1]. Second, the stock
pays a final dividend DT at the terminal date T that pins down the terminal stock
price:
lim
t↑T
St = DT , P-a.s. (2.3)
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The terminal condition (2.3) requires the stock-price process S = (St)t∈[0,T ] to be
left-continuous at time t = T . We refer to Ohasi (1991, 1992) for a discussion of
(2.3). A boundary condition like (2.3) is needed since our model, for mathematical
tractability, has a finite time horizon. However, by making T large, the terminal
liquidating dividend DT is small relative to total dividends
∫ T
0
Dsds + DT . In the
next section, we require that (2.3) holds for both investor i’s perceived stock-price
process S = Si (to be defined in Section 2.3) and for the equilibrium stock-price
process S = Sˆ (to be proven to exist in Section 3).
The Brownian motion Wi,t generates idiosyncratic income shocks in the income
rate process Yi,t for trader i ∈ {1, ..., I}. We model Yi,t as in Christensen, Larsen, and
Munk (2012) and define
dYi,t := µY dt+ σY
(
ρdBt +
√
1− ρ2dWi,t
)
, Yi,0 ∈ R. (2.4)
Investor i’s income consists of a flow of income over [0, T ] resulting in cumulative
income given by
∫ T
0
Yi,sds and then a lump-sum income payment Yi,T at the end. The
terminal payment Yi,T is a reduced-form for the value of a flow of income after the
terminal date T . Similar to the boundary condition for dividends, the terminal lump-
sum income YT can be made small relative to total income
∫ T
0
Ysds+YT by making T
large. In the income rate dynamics (2.4), the given initial value is Yi,0, the constant
drift is µY , the constant volatility coefficient is σY ≥ 0, and ρ ∈ [−1, 1] is a correlation
parameter controlling the relative magnitudes of investor-specific (i.e., idiosyncratic)
income shocks and income shocks correlated with the dividend process in (2.2). For
example, ρ := 0 makes all income shocks independent of dividend shocks. When
ρ2 < 1 in (2.4), no single stock-price process can span all risk because any model with
multiple Brownian motions and only one stock is necessarily incomplete by the Second
Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing. However, when ρ2 = 1, all randomness in
the model is due to the Brownian motion Bt, and model completeness is possible.
While the assumption of homogenous income coefficients is common in many Nash
equilibrium models, Section 5 below considers an extension with heterogenous investor
income coefficients.
We model the asset-holding decisions of a group of j ∈ {1, ..., I}, I ∈ N, strategic
traders. We normalize the strategic traders’ endowed money market balances to zero.
Traders begin with exogenous initial individual stock endowments equal to constants
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θj,0 ∈ R for j ∈ {1, ..., I}. Their stock-holding processes over time are
θj,t := θj,0 +
∫ t
0
θ′j,udu, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.5)
This restriction forces traders to use only holding processes given by continuous order-
rate processes θ′j,t. This rate-process restriction has been used in various equilibrium
models including Back, Cao, and Willard (2000), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005),
Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2016), and Bouchard, Fukasawa, Herdegen, and Muhle-Karbe
(2018). In Section 5 below we show how to incorporate discrete orders (i.e., block
orders) into the model.
At time t ∈ [0, T ], trader i chooses an order-rate process θ′i,t and a consump-
tion rate process ci,t. In aggregate, these processes clear the stock and real-good
consumption markets in the sense that
L =
I∑
i=1
θi,t, LDt +
I∑
i=1
Yi,t =
I∑
i=1
ci,t, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.6)
where L is the constant stock supply. Walras’ law ensures that clearing in the stock
and real-good consumption markets lead to clearing in the zero-supply money market.
The terminal stock price (2.3) ensures clearing in the real good consumption market
at the terminal time T .
Our model is constructed to investigate how price-impact affects risk-sharing and,
thus, asset pricing. Two specific types of risk-sharing distortions are present in the
model: The first is potential deviations of investors’ initial endowments θi,0 from equal
holdings L
I
. A second distortion is unspanned stochastic investor income. Section 3
investigates both distortions.
2.2 Individual utility-maximization problems
With price-impact in our model, traders perceive that their holdings θi,t and order
rates θ′i,t affect the prices at which they trade and their resulting wealth dynamics. In
particular, price-impact here is due to the impact of investor holdings on the market-
clearing aggregate risk-bearing capacity of the market, and a microstructure impact
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of investor trading. Trader i’s perceived wealth process is defined by
Xi,t := θi,tSi,t +Mi,t, t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, ..., I}, (2.7)
where θi,t denotes her stock holdings, Si,t is her perceived stock-price process, and Mi,t
is her money-market balance (all these processes are to be determined in equilibrium
endogenously). In a Nash equilibrium model, the perceived stock-price processes
Si,t in (2.7) can differ off-equilibrium across traders given their different hypothetical
holdings θi,t and trades θ
′
i,t but the equilibrium stock-price process Sˆt is identical for all
traders. On the other hand, we assume all traders perceive the same deterministically
time-varying interest rate r(t), t ∈ [0, T ] (to be determined endogenously).
Recall that we have normalized each strategic trader’s initial money market ac-
count balance to zero whereas the initial endowed stock holdings are exogenously
given by θi,0 ∈ R. The self-financing condition produces trader i’s perceived wealth
dynamics
dXi,t = r(t)Mi,tdt+ θi,t(dSi,t +Dtdt) + (Yi,t − ci,t)dt, Xi,0 = θi,0Si,0. (2.8)
As usual in continuous-time stochastic control problems, the traders’ controls must
satisfy various regularity conditions.
Definition 2.1 (Admissibility). An order-rate process θ′i = (θ
′
i,t)t∈[0,1] and a consumption-
rate process ci = (ci,t)t∈[0,1] are admissible, and we write (θ′i, ci) ∈ A if:
(i) The processes (θ′i, ci) have continuous paths and are progressively measurable
with respect to the filtration Ft in (2.1).
(ii) The stock-holding process θi,t defined by (2.5) is uniformly bounded.
(iii) The wealth process dynamics (2.8) as well as the corresponding money market
account balance process Mi,t := Xi,t − Si,tθi,t are well-defined and
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E[eζMi,t ] <∞ for all ζ ∈ R. (2.9)
(iv) The perceived stock-price process Si,t satisfies the terminal condition (2.3).
♦
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Each trader i seeks to solve5
inf
(θ′i,ci)∈A
E
[∫ T
0
e−aci,t−δtdt+ e−a(Xi,T+Yi,T )−δT
]
, i = 1, ..., I, (2.10)
given the perceived stock-price process Si,t in her wealth dynamics (2.8). In (2.10),
the term
∫ T
0
e−aci,t−δtdt denotes utility from the consumption flow rates and the term
e−a(Xi,T+Yi,T )−δT is a bequest value function for terminal wealth. Like the terminal
dividend DT and the lump-sum terminal income YT , the bequest utility function prox-
ies the continuation utility past the terminal time in our model. For tractability, the
common absolute risk-aversion coefficient a > 0 is the same for both the consumption
flow utility and the bequest value function. The common time preference parameter
is δ ≥ 0. The assumption of homogenous exponential utilities is common in many
Nash equilibrium models, see, e.g., Vayanos (1999). In Section 5 below we allow for
heterogenous exponential utilities across investors.
The next subsection derives stock-price dynamics perceived by trader i when solv-
ing (2.10) as part of our Nash equilibrium with price-impact. These perceived price
dynamics differ from those in the competitive Radner and Pareto-efficient equilibria
where all traders perceive the same stock-price and act as price-takers. We describe
the analogous competitive Radner equilibrium in Appendix C and the analogous com-
petitive Pareto-efficient equilibrium in Appendix D. As is shown below, neither our
Nash model with price-impact nor the analogous competitive Radner model is Pareto
efficient. In addition, when the idiosyncratic income shocks are turned off, the Rad-
ner equilibrium reduces to the Pareto-efficient equilibrium whereas our Nash model
remains Pareto inefficient due to price-impact.
2.3 Price-impact for the stock market
The perceived stock-price process Si,t for trader i depends on market-clearing given
how the other traders j ∈ {1, ..., I} \ {i} respond to trader i’s hypothetical choices of
θ′i,t. Thus, for a Nash equilibrium, we must model how traders j, j 6= i, respond to
an arbitrary control θ′i,t used by trader i.
Several different price-impact models are available in the literature: Kyle (1985)
and Back (1992) use continuous-time price-impact functions in which price changes
5The negative sign in the exponential utility is removed for simplicity, which leads to the mini-
mization problem in (2.10).
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dSi,t are affine in orders dθi,t. Cvitanic´ and Cuoco (1998) take the drift process in
dSi,t to be a function of θi,t. The affine price-impact function (2.14) we derive below
can be found in the single-trader optimal order-execution models in Almgren (2003)
and Schied and Scho¨neborn (2009). Our Nash equilibrium model with price-impact
can be seen as a continuous-time version of the discrete-time Nash equilibrium model
in Vayanos (1999) where Si,tn is affine in discrete orders ∆θi,tn .
For a fixed trader with index i ∈ {1, ..., I}, we conjecture that the perceived
responses used by other traders j, j 6= i, to hypothetical holdings θi,t and trades θ′i,t
by investor i are given by
θ′j,t := A0(t)
(
F (t)Dt − Si,t
)
+ A1(t)θj,t + A2(t)θi,t + A3(t)θ
′
i,t, j 6= i, (2.11)
for deterministic functions of time A0(t), ..., A3(t). The intuition behind (2.11) is that
investors j 6= i are perceived by investor i to have base levels for their orders θ′j,t that
they then adjust given the controlled price level Si,t (which is affected by trader i’s
holdings θi,t and orders θ
′
i,t) relative to an adjusted dividend level F (t)Dt where F (t)
is the annuity6
F (t) :=
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t r(u)duds+ e−
∫ T
t r(u)du, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.12)
The response specification in (2.11) also allows the perceived responses of investors
j 6= i to depend directly on investor i’s hypothetical holdings θi,t and orders θ′i,t. Thus,
Si,t is not assumed to be a sufficient statistic for the effects of θi,t and θ
′
i,t on θ
′
j,t. At
the end of this subsection, we show that (2.11) can be rewritten as trader j deviating
from j’s equilibrium behavior in response to trader i’s off-equilibrium behavior.
The perceived investor-response functions A0(t), ..., A3(t) in (2.11) are not sim-
ply assumed. Rather, these functions are endogenously determined in equilibrium in
Theorem 3.3 below given market-clearing, certain belief-consistency conditions (de-
scribed in Definition 3.1 below), and given a microstructure parameter that implicitly
determines the temporary (transitory) price-impact of trading.
The stock-price process Si,t trader i perceives in her optimization problem (2.10) is
found using the stock-market clearing conditions (2.6) given the perceived responses
6For future reference, note that (2.12) is equivalent to F (T ) = 1 and F ′(t) = r(t)F (t)− 1.
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in (2.11):
0 = θ′i,t +
∑
j 6=i
θ′j,t
= θ′i,t + (I − 1)A0(t)
(
F (t)Dt − Si,t
)
+ A1(t)(L− θi,t) + (I − 1)
(
A2(t)θi,t + A3(t)θ
′
i,t
)
.
(2.13)
Provided that A0(t) 6= 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], we can solve (2.13) for trader i’s perceived
market-clearing stock-price process:
Si,t = DtF (t) +
A1(t)L
A0(t)(I−1) +
A2(t)(I−1)−A1(t)
A0(t)(I−1) θi,t +
A3(t)(I−1)+1
A0(t)(I−1) θ
′
i,t. (2.14)
Trader i’s stock holdings θi,t and orders θ
′
i,t affect the perceived stock-price process
(2.14) as follows. Similar to Almgren (2003), the sum F (t)Dt +
A1(t)L
A0(t)(I−1) in (2.14) is
called the fundamental stock-price process. The coefficient A2(t)(I−1)−A1(t)
A0(t)(I−1) on holdings
θi,t in (2.14) is the permanent price-impact (positive in equilibrium) because the
price-impact effect of investor i’s past trading persists even after trading stops (when
θ′i,t = 0 and θi,t 6= 0). The coefficient A3(t)(I−1)+1A0(t)(I−1) on the order rate θ′i,t in (2.14) is the
temporary price-impact (positive in equilibrium) because this component of the price-
impact effect disappears when investor i stops trading (i.e., when θ′i,t = 0). Theorem
3.3 below provides A0(t), ..., A3(t) via solutions to a coupled system of ODEs.
To see that (2.10) is a quadratic minimization problem for the perceived stock-
price process (2.14), we use the money-market account balance process Mi,t from (2.7)
defined by
Mi,t := Xi,t − θi,tSi,t, i ∈ {1, ..., I}, (2.15)
as a state-process. The wealth dynamics (2.8) produce the following dynamics of the
money-market account balance process
dMi,t = dXi,t − d(θi,tSi,t)
= r(t)Mi,tdt+ θi,t(dSi,t +Dtdt) + (Yi,t − ci,t)dt− θ′i,tSi,tdt− θi,tdSi,t
=
(
r(t)Mi,t + θi,tDt − Si,tθ′i,t + Yi,t − ci,t
)
dt.
(2.16)
The second equality in (2.16) uses the quadratic variation property 〈θi, Si〉t = 0, which
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holds because θi,t satisfies the order-rate condition (2.5). As shown in the proof in
Appendix B, the affinity in the price-impact function (2.14) and the last line in (2.16)
make the individual optimization problems (2.10) tractable.
Trader i’s control θ′i,t appears implicitly in trader j’s response (2.11) through the
stock-price process Si = (Si,t)t∈[0,1] and directly via θi,t and θ′i,t. Substituting (2.14)
into (2.11), the resulting response functions for j 6= i give trader j’s response directly
in terms of trader i’s orders θ′i,t and associated holdings θi,t, where trader j’s response
is affine in those quantities:
θ′j,t = A1(t)θj,t +
A1(t)
1− I (L− θi,t) +
1
1− I θ
′
i,t. (2.17)
Furthermore, the equilibrium holdings (θˆi,t, θˆj,t) and order-rate processes (θˆ
′
i,t, θˆ
′
j,t) in
Theorem 3.3 are consistent with (2.11) in the sense
θˆ′j,t = A0(t)
(
F (t)Dt − Sˆt
)
+ A1(t)θˆj,t + A2(t)θˆi,t + A3(t)θˆ
′
i,t, j 6= i, (2.18)
given the equilibrium stock-price process Sˆt. This allows us re-write (2.17) as
θ′j,t = θˆ
′
j,t − A1(t)(θˆj,t − θj,t) +
1
I − 1(θˆ
′
i,t − θ′i,t)−
A1(t)
I − 1(θˆi,t − θi,t). (2.19)
Thus, the responses in (2.19) describe deviations of θ′j,t from equilibrium behavior θˆ
′
j,t
for trader j, j 6= i, in response to trader i’s off-equilibrium deviations of θ′i,t from θˆ′i,t.
Note here that the equilibrium holdings (θˆi,t, θˆj,t) and order-rate processes (θˆ
′
i,t, θˆ
′
j,t),
j 6= i, in (2.19) do not depend on trader i’s arbitrary orders θ′i,t and holdings θi,t.
2.4 Modeling approach
This section briefly describes modeling differences between our analysis and other
asset pricing models and explains the motivation and reasons for these differences.
With pricing-taking exponential investors, the initial endowed stock-holding dis-
tribution across investors is irrelevant, as is well-known, in asset pricing models.
However, our exponential investors are strategic in that they perceive their holdings
and trades to have price-impact, which explains why our equilibrium model exhibits
stock endowment effects. However, these endowment effects are due to a risk-bearing
mechanism rather than a wealth effect. When investors are endowed with non-Pareto
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efficient initial stock endowments in terms of risk-sharing, it is suboptimal for in-
vestors to immediately trade to their Radner allocations due to their perceived costs
given their perceived price-impact (when ρ2 = 1 in (2.4), the idiosyncratic income
shocks disappear and the Radner equilibrium becomes Pareto efficient). The devia-
tion of risk-sharing in the model relative to the Radner equilibrium, in turn, affects
investor stock demands, which has price effects. It is this risk-sharing based endow-
ment mechanism that allows our model to simultaneously affect the three asset pricing
puzzles mentioned in the introduction and detailed in Section 4 below.
While the intuition behind the risk-sharing based endowment mechanism is simple
— i.e., it is costly to rebalance to efficient positions given price-impact — our main
technical contribution gives the existence of a tractable continuous-time incomplete
price-impact equilibrium model. There are two key ingredients in its construction:
Exponential utilities (which could be heterogenous as in Section 5.2 below) and price-
impact perceptions as in Almgren (2003). Exponential utilities — while not common
in the standard general equilibrium asset pricing literature (which uses power utility
or Epstein-Zin preferences) — are widely used in equilibrium models of trading such
as, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Vayanos (1999). Since our model requires
market-clearing by heterogenous investors (due to their heterogenous stock holdings),
exponential utilities make market-clearing tractable. The second ingredient, perceived
price-impact, necessitates, for tractability, that we restrict investors to use trading-
rate processes, which, although less common than other continuous-time processes,
have been used in other equilibrium trading models including Back, Cao, and Willard
(2000), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), and Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2016).
Our model’s time horizon is finite but can be arbitrary long. Because of slow trad-
ing due to price-impact, our investors’ heterogenous stock holdings converge gradually
over time to the Radner allocations over the time horizon. Consequently, our model is
non-stationary, and, in particular, the asset pricing effects of price-impact are short-
term in nature. However, to the extent that investors are repeatedly shocked away
from efficient risk sharing and need to trade (as in, e.g., Vayanos, 1999), the model
and its asset pricing effects could be made stationary.
3 Price-impact equilibrium
The definition of a Nash equilibrium in our setting is as follows:
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Definition 3.1 (Nash equilibrium). Continuous functions of time A0, ..., A3 : [0, T ]→
R constitute a Nash equilibrium if:
(i) The solution (cˆi,t, θˆ
′
i,t) to trader i’s individual optimization problem (2.10) with
the price-impact function (2.14) exists for all i ∈ {1, ..., I}.
(ii) The stock-price processes resulting from inserting trader i’s optimizer θˆ′i,t into
the price-impact function Si,t in (2.14) are identical for all traders i ∈ {1, ..., I}.
This common stock-price process, denoted by Sˆt, satisfies the terminal dividend
restriction (2.3).
(iii) The individual orders (θˆ′i,t)
I
i=1 and corresponding holding processes (θˆi,t)
I
i=1 sat-
isfy the consistency requirement (2.18).
(iv) The real-good consumption market clearing and the stock-market clearing con-
ditions (2.6) hold at all times t ∈ [0, T ].
♦
Our main existence equilibrium existence result is based on the following technical
lemma (the proof is in Appendix B below). It guarantees the existence of a solution to
an autonomous forward-backward system of coupled ODEs with forward component
ψ and backward components (F,Q,Q2, Q22). Similar forward-backward systems have
appeared in equilibrium theory. For example, in Kyle (1985), the forward component
is the filter and the backward components are the value function coefficients.
Lemma 3.2. For all α > 0, there exists a constant w ≥ L2
I
such that the unique
solutions of the coupled ODE system
ψ′(t) = 2
F (t)Q22(t)
α
(
ψ(t)− L
2
I
)
, ψ(T ) = w, (3.1)
F ′(t) = F (t)
(
δ − a2σ2D2I ψ(t)−
a(aIσ2Y +2aLρσDσY −2IµY −2LµD)
2I
)
− 1, F (T ) = 1, (3.2)
Q′(t) = − δ
a
+
aQ(t)− log
(
1
F (t)
)
+ 1
aF (t)
+
aσ2Y
2
− L
2F (t)Q22(t)
2
αI2
− µY , Q(T ) = 0, (3.3)
Q′2(t) = aρσDσY +
2LF (t)Q22(t)
2
αI
+
Q2(t)
F (t)
− µD, Q2(T ) = 0, (3.4)
Q′22(t) = aσ
2
D −
2F (t)Q22(t)
2
α
+
Q22(t)
F (t)
, Q22(T ) = 0, (3.5)
satisfy ψ(0) =
∑I
i=1 θ
2
i,0.
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Next, we give our main theoretical result. In this theorem, the parameter α > 0 is
a free input parameter, which controls the temporary price-impact effect (see (3.10)
below). In Appendix E, we use calibrate α to match observed data.
Theorem 3.3. Let (ψ, F,Q,Q2, Q22) be as in Lemma 3.2 for initial stock endowments∑I
i=1 θi,0 = L. A Nash equilibrium then exists in which:
(i) The perceived investor response coefficients in (2.11) are
A0(t) :=
ILQ22(t)
α(I − 1)(IQ2(t) + 2LQ22(t)) , (3.6)
A1(t) :=
A0(t)(I − 1)F (t)
(
IQ2(t) + 2LQ22(t)
)
IL
, (3.7)
A2(t) :=
A0(t)F (t)
(
IQ2(t)− (I − 2)LQ22(t)
)
IL
, (3.8)
A3(t) := A0(t)α +
1
1− I , (3.9)
which simplifies the perceived price-impact model (2.14) to
Si,t = F (t)Dt + F (t)
(
2LQ22(t)
I
+Q2(t)
)
− F (t)Q22(t)θi,t + αθ′i,t. (3.10)
(ii) The equilibrium interest rate r(t) is given by
r(t) = δ − a
2σ2D
2I
ψ(t)− a (aIσ
2
Y + 2aLρσDσY − 2IµY − 2LµD)
2I
. (3.11)
(iii) The equilibrium stock-price process is
Sˆt = F (t)Dt + F (t)
(
LQ22(t)
I
+Q2(t)
)
, (3.12)
where F (t) is the annuity in (3.2) with explicit solution (2.12).
(iv) For i ∈ {1, ..., I}, trader i’s optimal order and consumption rates are:
θˆ′i,t = γ(t)
(
θˆi,t − L
I
)
, γ(t) :=
F (t)Q22(t)
α
, (3.13)
cˆi,t =
log
(
F (t)
)
a
+Dtθˆi,t +
Mˆi,t
F (t)
+Q(t) + θˆi,tQ2(t) +
1
2
θˆ2i,tQ22(t) + Yi,t. (3.14)
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Remark 3.1.
1. The equilibrium stock-price process (3.12) is Gaussian. Such Bachelier stock-
price models are common equilibrium prices in many settings including Kyle
(1985), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), and Hellwig (1980).
2. Our Nash equilibrium model with price-impact has stock endowment effects
because the equilibrium stock holdings θˆi,t for trader i in (3.13) depend on the
initial endowed holdings θi,0:
θˆi,t =
L
I
+
(
θi,0 − L
I
)
e
∫ t
0 γ(s)ds, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.15)
In contrast, in the competitive Radner equilibrium (with no price-impact),
trader i’s time t ∈ (0, 1] equilibrium holdings are L/I regardless of trader i’s
endowed holdings θi,0. Section 4 below shows that the stock-endowment depen-
dency ultimately allows our Nash equilibrium model to simultaneously resolve
some asset pricing puzzles.
3. Heterogeneity in initial stock holdings leads to distortions in risk-sharing over
time that affect asset pricing. Appendix B shows that the solution of (3.1)
satisfies ψ(t) =
∑I
i=1 θˆ
2
i,t, which is our metric for stock-holding heterogeneity. If
the initial stock endowments are equal with θi,0 =
L
I
, then ψ′(t) = 0 from (3.1);
and hence, ψ(t) = L
2
I
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In this case, the equilibrium interest
rate in (3.11) becomes the analogous competitive Radner equilibrium interest
rate given by (see Appendix C below):
rRadner := δ − a
2σ2DL
2
2I2
− a (aIσ
2
Y + 2aLρσDσY − 2IµY − 2LµD)
2I
. (3.16)
For non-equal endowments (i.e., non-Pareto efficient), Cauchy-Schwart’s in-
equality produces
∑I
i=1 θ
2
i,0 >
L2
I
, which leads to ψ(t) =
∑I
i=1 θˆ
2
i,t >
L2
I
for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. In that case, the Nash equilibrium interest rate (3.11) is strictly
smaller than the competitive Radner equilibrium interest rate in (3.16). Thus,
inequality in investor stock endowments as measured by
∑I
i=1 θˆ
2
i,t − L
2
I
is a key
factor in our model’s ability to resolve the interest rate puzzle and, as shown in
Section 4 below, also affects the other asset pricing puzzles. However, over time,
the equilibrium holdings in (3.15) converge to equal holdings (Pareto efficient)
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and so these asset pricing effects are temporary.
4. Even if the analogous competitive Radner equilibrium is Pareto-efficient (i.e.,
if investor income is spanned), our Nash equilibrium can be non-Pareto effi-
cient. To see this, set ρ2 = 1 in the income dynamics (2.4), which makes the
analogous competitive Radner model complete. In this case, the interest rate
(3.16) in the competitive Radner equilibrium agrees with the Pareto efficient
interest rate given in (D.4) in Appendix D below. However, as long as θi,0 6= LI
for some trader i, we have
∑I
i=1 θ
2
i,0 >
L2
I
by Cauchy-Schwartz’s inequality and,
consequently, ψ(t) =
∑I
i=1 θˆ
2
i,t >
L2
I
by (3.1). Thus, even if the competitive
Radner equilibrium is Pareto-efficient because ρ2 = 1 in (2.4), the Nash equilib-
rium interest rate (3.11) is strictly smaller than the Pareto-efficient equilibrium
interest rate (D.4) whenever θi,0 6= LI for some trader i.
5. Unspanned investor-income randomness also affects risk-sharing and asset pric-
ing. Individual investor income Yi,t is optimally consumed, as seen in (3.14),
and, thus, income shocks do not directly affect optimal investor holdings. As a
result, investor trading in (3.13) is deterministic, which simplifies the modeling
of the stock endowment effects. However, the parameters of the investor income
process do affect asset pricing in (3.11) and (3.12) and the optimal trading rate
θˆ′i,t in (3.13). Thus, imperfect risk-sharing due to both distortions in initial
stock endowments and unspanned (idiosyncratic) shocks to investor income has
asset-pricing effects with price-impact.
6. The proof of Theorem 3.3 in Appendix B is based on the standard dynamical
programming principle and HJB equations. Thus, by definition, the individ-
ual optimization problems in our Nash equilibrium model are time-consistent.
However, it might appear that our Nash equilibrium model is time-inconsistent
given that the optimal holdings θˆi,t in (3.15) depend on the endowed holdings
θi,0 (see, e.g., the discussion in Remark 3 on p.455 in Basak, 1997). The expla-
nation for why our Nash equilibrium is time-consistent while the equilibrium
holdings θˆi,t depend on the endowed holdings θi,0 lies in the state-processes and
controls used in the proof of Theorem 3.3, summarized in Table 1:
For time-consistent optimization problems, the initial control values cannot ap-
pear in the optimal controls. However, because the trading rate θ′i,t is the control
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Table 1: State-processes and controls used.
State processes Controls
Nash Mi,t, Dt, θi,t ci,t, θ
′
i,t
Radner and Pareto Xi,t ci,t, θi,t
— not stock holdings θi,t — in the Nash equilibrium model, the endowment θi,0
can (and do) appear in the time-consistent individual optimal holdings θˆi,t in
(3.15). Likewise, the Radner and Pareto equilibrium models are time-consistent,
and so the endowment θi,0 cannot (and do not) appear in the individual optimal
holdings L
I
.
4 Asset-pricing puzzles
This section shows that our continuous-time price-impact equilibrium model produces
material differences relative to the analogous Pareto-efficient equilibrium. In particu-
lar, based on the C-CAPM from Breeden (1979), Appendix D derives the analogous
Pareto-efficient equilibrium where all investors act as price-takers and markets are
complete. We show how price-impact simultaneously affects the three main asset-
pricing puzzles (risk-free rate, equity premium, and volatility). We do this both
analytically and by illustrating the equilibrium differences in a numerical example.
The differences between our model and the Pareto-efficient equilibrium are due to per-
ceived price-impact, heterogenous stock holdings, and market incompleteness (due to
idiosyncratic income risk when ρ2 < 1).
Our conclusion is that, by using the Pareto-efficient equilibrium model as a bench-
mark, our price-impact Nash equilibrium model can simultaneously help resolve the
risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989), and the volatility puzzle of LeRoy and Porter
(1981) and Shiller (1981). Price-impact also moves the Sharpe ratio in the right di-
rection qualitatively for the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985),
but the effect is quantitatively small. These empirical works on asset-pricing puzzles
compare a competitive representative agent model with historical data. Such repre-
sentative agent models are (effectively) complete and therefore also Pareto efficient by
the First Welfare theorem. Therefore, we use the Pareto efficient equilibrium interest
rate and stock-price process as benchmarks.
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4.1 Discussion
First, consider the risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989). Pareto-efficient equilibrium
models predict interest rates that are too high compared to empirical evidence. For
the Nash equilibrium interest rate r(t) in (3.11), the analogous competitive interest
rate rRadner in (3.16), and the analogous Pareto-efficient interest rate rPareto in (D.4)
in Appendix D, we have the ordering
r(t) ≤ rRadner ≤ rPareto, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.1)
Whenever there is unspanned income risk (i.e., when ρ2 < 1), Christensen, Larsen,
and Munk (2012) show that rRadner < rPareto due to a precautionary saving effect.
Here, we find r(t) < rRadner whenever there is stock-endowment inequality in that
θi,0 6= L/I for some trader i ∈ {1, ..., I}.7 The intuition is that price-impact costs
cause investors to rebalance more slowly, which exacerbates risk-bearing inefficiency,
which, in turn, magnifies stock risk and increases bond demand.
Second, consider the volatility puzzle of LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller
(1981). Pareto-efficient models predict a stock-price volatility that is too low com-
pared to empirical evidence. The ordering (4.1) reverses the annuity ordering:
F (t) ≥ FRadner(t) ≥ FPareto(t), (4.2)
where F (t) is given by the ODE (3.2) and
d
dt
FRadner(t) = FRadner(t)rRadner − 1, FRadner(T ) = 1, (4.3)
d
dt
FPareto(t) = FPareto(t)rPareto − 1, FPareto(T ) = 1. (4.4)
Consequently, the ordering (4.2) and the equilibrium stock-price processes (3.12),
(C.2), and (D.5) produce the volatility ordering measured by quadratic variation
d〈Sˆ〉t ≥ d〈SRadner〉t ≥ d〈SPareto〉t, (4.5)
with strict inequalities whenever the inequalities in (4.1) are strict. The intuition is
7Even without idiosyncratic income risks (i.e., ρ2 = 1 so that rRadner = rPareto), we have r(t) <
rRadner.
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that the multiplication of the current dividend Dt by F (t) in (3.12) represents an
annuity-valuation effect for the stream of future dividends following Dt at time t.
Thus, lower interest rates in the Nash equilibrium intensify this annuity effect.
Third, consider the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985). Pareto-
efficient models predict the stock’s excess return over the risk-free rate to be too low
compared to empirical evidence. To address the equity premium puzzle, we start by
recalling the definition of the equity premium:
EP(t) : = E
[
Sˆt − Sˆ0 +
∫ t
0
Due
∫ t
u r(s)dsdu
Sˆ0
]
−
(
e
∫ t
0 r(u)du − 1
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.6)
In (4.6), the interest rate r(t) is given in (3.11) with the corresponding (determinis-
tic) money market account price process is e
∫ t
0 r(u)du and the equilibrium stock-price
process Sˆt is given in (3.12). Based on (4.6), we define the Sharpe ratio measured
over a time interval [0, t] as
SR(t) :=
EP(t)
V
[ Sˆt−Sˆ0+∫ t0 Du S(0)t
S
(0)
u
du
Sˆ0
− (e∫ t0 r(u)du − 1)] 12
, t ∈ (0, T ],
(4.7)
where V[·] in the denominator in (4.7) is the variance operator. Because models based
on noise generated by Brownian motions produce expected returns and variances
growing linear in t for t > 0 small, we consider the time-normalized Sharpe ratio
defined by SR(t)√
t
for a horizon t ∈ (0, T ]. The instantaneous Sharpe ratio is defined as
the limit
λ : = lim
t↓0
SR(t)√
t
=
a
I
(LσD + IσY ρ).
(4.8)
The coefficient λ in (4.8) is called the market price of risk because the dynamics of
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the Nash equilibrium stock-price process (3.12) are
dSˆt = F (t)
(
dDt +
LQ′22(t)
I
dt+Q′2(t)dt
)
+
F ′(t)
F (t)
Sˆtdt
=
(
r(t)Sˆt −Dt + aσD(LσD + IρσY )F (t)
I
)
dt+ F (t)σDdBt
=
(
r(t)Sˆt −Dt
)
dt+ F (t)σD
(
dBt + λdt
)
.
(4.9)
The Sharpe ratios SRRadner(t) and SRPareto(t) are defined analogously for the compet-
itive Radner and Pareto-efficient equilibrium stock-price processes SRadner from (C.2)
and SPareto from (D.5) and interest rates rRadner from (3.16) and rPareto from (D.4).
The numerics in the next section illustrate that our Nash equilibrium model with
price-impact can produce a higher Sharpe ratio than both the Radner and Pareto
equilibrium models; that is, we shall see
SR(t) ≥ SRRadner(t) ≥ SRPareto(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (4.10)
for reasonable model parameters. Because the equity premium puzzle involves em-
pirical Sharpe ratios estimated over discrete horizons (e.g., monthly or annually), the
ordering of finite-horizon [0, t] Sharpe ratios in (4.10) is the relevant measure. How-
ever, Section 4.2 below shows that the magnitudes of the Sharpe ratio difference in
(4.10) are quantitatively small. The reason is that, as t ↓ 0, the time-normalized
discrete-horizon Sharpe ratios in all three models (Nash, Radner, and Pareto) are
anchored to the same instantaneous Sharpe ratio λ in (4.8).8 Note here that the
Sharpe ratio (4.7) is a ratio of integrals and not an integral of instantaneous Sharpe
ratios. Therefore, for t > 0 small, the Nash Sharpe ratios (4.7) are similar to the
analogous Sharpe ratios in the Radner and Pareto equilibria. However, over longer
horizons t > 0, our Nash equilibrium model with price-impact can produce modestly
bigger Sharpe ratios (4.7) than the analogous Radner and Pareto equilibrium models.
8There are several ways model incompleteness can produce a different instantaneous Sharpe ratio
in the competitive (i.e., price-taking) Radner equilibrium model relative to the analogous efficient
Pareto model: (i) Traders can be restricted to only consume discretely as in Constantinides and
Duffie (1996), (ii) The underlying filtration can have jumps as in, e.g., Barro (2006) and Larsen and
Sae-Sue (2016), and (iii) Non-time additive utilities as in, e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004). Christensen
and Larsen (2014, p.273) prove that the instantaneous Sharpe ratios in the Radner and Pareto
equilibrium models always agree in a setting based on exponential utilities in a continuous-time
consumption model with noise generated by Brownian motions. See also the discussion in Cochrane
(2008, p.310).
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4.2 Numerics
This section presents calibrated numerics to illustrate the effect of price-impact on
all three asset-pricing puzzles. In our numerics, time is measured on an annual basis
(i.e., one year is t = 1). We normalize the outstanding stock supply to L := 100.
As noted in Remark 3.1.3, the key quantity in explaining the asset pricing puzzles
is the heterogeneity in investors’ initial endowments as measured by the difference∑I
i=1 θ
2
i,0 − L
2
I
≥ 0 which is a metric for the distance of the initial stock endowments
from Pareto efficiency. To provide some intuition for this difference, we note that the
cross-sectional average and standard deviation of a set of initial stock endowments
~θ0 := {θ1,0, ..., θI,0} are
mean
[
~θ0
]
: =
1
I
I∑
i=1
θi,0
=
L
I
,
SD
[
~θ0
]
: =
√√√√1
I
( I∑
i=1
θ2i,0 −
L2
I
)
=
√
1
I
(
ψ(0)− L
2
I
)
,
(4.11)
where ψ(t) is the function from (3.1).
The utility parameters for (2.10) in our numerics are
δ := 0.02, a := 2. (4.12)
The annual time-preference rate δ is consistent with calibrated time preferences in
Bansal and Yaron (2004), and the level of absolute risk aversion a is from the nu-
merics in Christensen, Larsen, and Munk (2012). The coefficients for the arithmetic
Brownian motion for the stock dividends in (2.2) are
µD := 0.0201672, σD := 0.0226743, D0 := 1. (4.13)
The parameterizations of µD and σD are the annualized mean and standard deviation
of monthly percentage changes in aggregate real US stock market dividends from
January 1970 through December 2019 (from Robert Shiller’s website http://www.
22
econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm). The starting dividend rate D0 = 1 in (4.13)
is a normalization. The annualized income volatility and income-dividend correlation
are from the numerics in Christensen, Larsen, and Munk (2012):
σY = 0.1, ρ = 0. (4.14)
The drift µY and number of investors I ∈ N are found by calibrating the Radner
equilibrium model so that
λ = 0.302324, rRadner = 8.137%, (4.15)
which produces the remaining coefficients9
µY := −0.0709146, I = 15. (4.16)
We set the model horizon T to T := 3 years. In our analysis we found that our
numerics are relatively insensitive to T once T is sufficiently large.
We illustrate that price-impact in the Nash equilibrium can have a material effect
on asset pricing relative to the analogous Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Figure 1 shows
interest-rate and stock return-volatility trajectories over a year t ∈ [0, 1] for the Nash
equilibrium with price-impact, the price-taking Radner equilibrium, and the corre-
sponding Pareto-efficient equilibrium. For visibility, Figure 1 also shows differences
in Sharpe ratios between the Nash and Radner equilibria since these numerical values
are small.
The Nash model with price-impact has two additional parameters relative to the
competitive Radner model: The transitory price-impact coefficient α in (3.10) and the
difference
∑I
i=1 θˆ
2
i,t − L2/I = ψ(t) − L2/I for deviations of initial stock endowments
from the equal stock holdings, which is related to the SD[~θ] in (4.11). Figure 1
illustrates the sensitivity of asset pricing moments to these two parameters.
Figure 1, Plots A, C, and E show the effects of varying the temporary price-impact
parameter α > 0. Of course, when α > 0 is close to zero, our Nash equilibrium is close
to the Radner equilibrium. In our numerics, we consider two transitory price-impact
parameters of α ∈ {0.01, 0.002}. Appendix E shows that α = 0.002 is roughly con-
9The discount rate δ, dividend parameters µD and σD, and income parameters µY and σY are
all quoted in decimal form where 0.01 = 1%.
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sistent with transitory price-impact estimates in Almgren et al. (2005). To put them
in perspective, a price-impact of α = 0.002 means if an investor trades at a constant
rate θ′i = 265 to sell
∫ 1
265
0
θ′idt = 1 unit of the stock over a day (i.e., a large daily
parent trade of 1 percent of L = 100 shares outstanding), the associated transitory
price increase at each time t in the day would be 0.002× 265 = 0.53. Given that the
stock (with α = 0.002 and SD[~θ] = 5) has an endogenous initial equilibrium price
of Sˆ0 = 3.5737 (see Table 2), this corresponds to a sustained percentage transitory
price-impact of 0.002×265
3.5737
= 14.83% over the day.
The price-impact feature in the Nash equilibrium can produce up to a 2% annual
interest rate reduction (the reduction is biggest for shorter horizons). We see that the
stock-return volatility increases by around 0.25% relative to the Radner volatility. The
impact on the Sharpe ratio, while in the right direction qualitatively, is quantitatively
small. The Sharpe ratio effects are biggest for longer horizons (as already discussed
after (4.10), for short horizons the Sharpe ratios are anchored to the instantaneous
Sharpe ratio λ). Finally, from Plots A, C, and E, we see that all three asset-pricing
impacts are increasing in the temporary price-impact coefficient α > 0.
Figure 1, Plots B, D, and F consider the effect of different levels of stock-endowment
inequality (SD[~θ0] ∈ {5, 10}). As
∑I
i=1 θ
2
i,0 approaches the lower bound
L2
I
from
Cauchy-Schwartz’s inequality, the Nash equilibrium converges to the Radner equilib-
rium. Plots B, D, and F, show that that all three asset-pricing impacts are increasing
in investor heterogeneity as measured by the difference
∑I
i=1 θ
2
i,0 − L
2
I
.
Table 2: Numerical output. Numbers inside () and [ ] are from the analogous (Radner)
and [Pareto-efficient] equilibria.
SD
[
~θ0
]
α Sˆ0
∑I
i=1 θˆ
2
i,T SR(1) r(0)
5 0.002 3.5737 (3.5276) [3.4112] 677.4 0.3010 5.558% (8.137%) [10.003%]
10 0.002 3.7135 (3.5276) [3.4112] 708.9 0.3010 -2.196% (8.137%) [10.003%]
5 0.01 3.6200 (3.5276) [3.4112] 782 0.3011 5.569% (8.137%) [10.003%]
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Figure 1: Trajectories of interest rates (Plots A and B), stock-price volatility (Plots C
and D), and Sharpe ratio differences SR(t)− SRRadner(t) (Plots E and F) for t ∈ [0, 1]
over the first year. The model parameters are given in (4.12), (4.13), (4.14), (4.16),
L := 100, T := 3 years, and the time discretization uses 250,000 rounds of trading
per year.
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0.00
0.02
0.04
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0.10
Interest rate
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t
-0.02
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0.06
0.08
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Interest rate
A: SD
[
~θ0
]
:= 5 B: α := 0.002
Nash: α := 0.002 (—–), α := 0.01 (−−), Nash SD[~θ0] := 5 (—–), SD[~θ0] := 10 (−−),
Radner: (− · −), Pareto: (− · ·−) Radner: (− · −), Pareto: (− · ·−)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
t0.060
0.065
0.070
0.075
0.080
Stock volatility
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
t0.060
0.065
0.070
0.075
0.080
Stock volatility
C: SD
[
~θ0
]
:= 5 D: α := 0.002
Nash: α := 0.002 (—–), α := 0.01 (−−), Nash: SD[~θ0] := 5 (—–), [~θ0] := 10 (−−),
Radner: (− · −), Pareto: (− · ·−) Radner: (− · −), Pareto: (− · ·−)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
t0.00000
0.00005
0.00010
0.00015
0.00020
Sharpe ratio increase
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
t0.00000
0.00005
0.00010
0.00015
0.00020
Sharpe ratio increase
E: SD
[
~θ0
]
:= 5 F: α := 0.002
Nash: α := 0.002 (—–), α := 0.01 (−−) Nash: SD[~θ0] := 5 (—–) , SD[~θ0] := 10 (−−)
25
5 Model extensions
Our analysis has shown how to construct a parsimonious and tractable model of price-
impact in continuous-time. However, the following three model extensions illustrate
our Nash equilibrium model’s analytical robustness to variations.
5.1 Discrete-orders
To illustrate that we can allow traders to also place discrete orders (i.e., block orders)
as well as consumption plans with lump sums, we consider a simple case. We allow
the traders to place block orders and consume in lumps at time t = 0 after which
they trade using order rates and consume using consumption rates for t ∈ (0, T ].
First, we start with block orders and use θi,0− to denote trader i’s initial stock
endowment so that ∆θi,0 := θi,0 − θi,0− denotes the block order at time t = 0. In
addition to (2.11) for t ∈ (0, T ], we conjecture the response at time t = 0 for trader
j 6= i to be
∆θj,0 = β0
(
F (0)D0 − Si,0
)
+ β1θj,0− + β2θi,0− + β3∆θi,0, (5.1)
where (β0, .., β3) are constants (to be determined). The price-impact function trader
i perceives is found using the stock-market clearing condition at time t = 0 when
summing (5.1):
0 = (I − 1)β0
(
F (0)D0 − Si,0
)
+ β1(L− θi,0−)
+ (I − 1)(β2θi,0− + β3∆θi,0)+ ∆θi,0. (5.2)
Provided that β0 6= 0, we can solve (5.2) for trader i’s perceived stock market-clearing
price at time t = 0:
Si,0 = D0F (0) +
β1L
β0(I − 1) +
β2(I − 1)− β1
β0(I − 1) θi,0− +
β3(I − 1) + 1
β0(I − 1) ∆θi,0. (5.3)
Second, we introduce time t = 0 lump sum consumption. Because stock prices
are denoted ex dividend, the initial wealth is
Xi,0 = (D0 + Si,0)θi,0− + Yi,0 − Ci, i ∈ {1, ..., I}, (5.4)
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where Ci is trader i’s lump sum consumption at time t = 0 (to be determined). The
expression for Xi,0 in (5.4) follows from the normalization that all strategic traders
have zero endowments in the money market account. By using (5.4), the time t = 0
money market account balance of (2.15) for trader i ∈ {1, ..., I} is given by
Mi,0 :=Xi,0 − Si,0θi,0
=D0θi,0− − Si,0∆θi,0 + Yi,0 − Ci.
(5.5)
Next, we show how to modify to the objective in (2.10) to allow for both time
t = 0 lump sum consumption Ci and block orders ∆θi,0. Trader i’s optimization
problem becomes:
inf
(∆θi,0,Ci)∈R2, (θ′i,ci)∈A
E
[
e−aCi +
∫ T
0
e−aci,t−δtdt+ e−a(Xi,1+Yi,T )−δT
]
= inf
(∆θi,0,Ci)∈R2
(
e−aCi + v(0,Mi,0, D0, θi,0, Yi,0)
)
,
(5.6)
where v is the value function defined below in (B.3) in Appendix B corresponding to
the objective in (2.10). To minimize the objective in (5.6), we insert Mi,0 from (5.5)
and θi,0 = θi,0−+ ∆θi,0 into the last line in (5.6) and minimize to produce the optimal
initial block order and lump sum consumption. For example, we have
Sˆ0 = F (0)
(
D0 +
LQ22(0)
I
+Q2(0)
)
,
θˆi,0 = θi,0− + β(θi,0− − L
I
),
(5.7)
where β is a free model parameter (similar to α in Theorem 3.3). From (5.7), we see
that Sˆ0 matches the initial stock price in (3.12). Moreover, because of price-impact,
we also see from (5.7) that trader i does not immediately jump to the Pareto efficient
holdings L
I
.
5.2 Heterogenous utilities and incomes
In addition to the I traders with utilities as in (2.10), we introduce a second group
of traders indexed by i ∈ {I + 1, ..., I + I¯}, I¯ ∈ N, with utilities given by
−e−a¯c−δ¯t, c ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.8)
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The coefficients a¯ > 0 and δ¯ ≥ 0 are potentially different from those in (2.10). These
traders have income rate processes similar to (2.4):
dYi,t := µ¯Y dt+ σ¯Y
(
ρ¯dBt +
√
1− ρ¯2dWi,t
)
, Yi,0 ∈ R, (5.9)
but the coefficients (µ¯Y , σ¯Y , ρ¯) are potentially different from those in (2.4).
In this heterogenous setting, a Nash equilibrium is given by deterministic functions
of time A0(t), ..., A3(t) and A¯0(t), .., A¯3(t). The response functions for trader i ∈
{1, ..., I} is as in (2.11) whereas for trader i ∈ {I + 1, ..., I + I¯} the conjectured
response function for trader j 6= i is
θ′j,t := A¯0(t)
(
F (t)Dt − Si,t
)
+ A¯1(t)θj,t + A¯2(t)θi,t + A¯3(t)θ
′
i,t. (5.10)
There are two different perceived stock-price processes with price-impact. For trader
i ∈ {1, ..., I}, the stock-price process subject to trader i’s choice of θ′i,t is found by
solving
0 =
I∑
j=1,j 6=i
θ′j,t +
I+I¯∑
j=I+1
θ′j,t + θ
′
i,t (5.11)
for Si,t. Similarly, for trader i ∈ {I + 1, ..., I + I¯}, the stock-price process subject to
trader i’s choice of θ′i,t is found by solving
0 =
I∑
j=1
θ′j,t +
I+I¯∑
j=I+1,j 6=i
θ′j,t + θ
′
i,t (5.12)
for Si,t. By doubling the number of Q functions, the existence result in Theorem 3.3
can be modified to include this extension.
5.3 Penalties
In this section, we replace the objective (2.10) with
inf
(θ′i,ci)∈A
E
[∫ T
0
e−aci,t−δtdt+ e−a(Xi,1+Yi,T−Li,T )−δT
]
, i = 1, ..., I, (5.13)
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where Li,T is a penalty term. We consider two specifications of Li. First, we can
incorporate high-frequency traders (HFTs) who are incentivized to hold zero positions
over time. We do this by defining the penalty processes:
Li,t :=
∫ t
0
κ(s)θ2i,sds, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, ..., I. (5.14)
The deterministic function κ : [0, T ]→ [0,∞) in (5.14) is a penalty-severity function.
The strength of κ(t) for t ∈ [0, T ] can vary periodically for times during overnight
periods vs during trading days to give HFTs stronger incentive to hold no stocks
overnight. Similar to the extension in subsection 5.2, it is also possible to consider
multiple groups of homogenous traders where traders in different groups have identical
penalty functions but different groups can have different penalty-severity functions.
Second, we can approximate transaction costs by penalizing trading rates (as in,
e.g., Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen 2016). We do this by defining the penalty processes:
Li,t :=
1
2
λ
∫ t
0
(θ′i,s)
2ds, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, ..., I. (5.15)
The constant λ > 0 in (5.15) is interpreted as a transaction cost parameter.
By altering the ODEs, the existence result in Theorem 3.3 can be modified to
include both penalties (5.14) and (5.15) and linear combinations of (5.14) and (5.15).
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown, formally and in numerical examples, that price-impact can
have material effects on asset pricing via an amplification effect on imperfect risk
sharing. Calibrated price-impact helps resolve both the interest rate and volatility
puzzles and has a small effect on the equity premium. In addition, we conjecture
that the introduction of jumps would increase the effect of price-impact on the equity
premium.
A Auxiliary ODE result
In the following ODE existence proof, there are no restrictions on the time horizon
T ∈ (0,∞) and the constant C0 ∈ R. We note that the ODE (A.3) is quadratic in
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g(t) and that the square coefficient − 2
α
is negative because α > 0 is the temporary
price-impact due to orders θ′i,t.
Proposition A.1. For I ∈ N, C0 ∈ R, and positive constants T, a, σD, α, k > 0 there
exists a unique constant hˆ0 ∈ (0, k) such that the ODE system:
h′(t) =
2g(t)
α
h(t), h(0) = h0, (A.1)
f ′(t) = 1 + f(t)
(
a2σ2D
2I
h(t)− C0
)
, f(0) = 1, (A.2)
g′(t) = aσ2Df(t)−
2
α
g(t)2 + g(t)
(
a2σ2D
2I
h(t)− C0
)
, g(0) = 0, (A.3)
with initial condition h0 := hˆ0, has a unique solution for t ∈ [0, T ] that satisfies
h(T ) = k.
Proof.
Step 1/3 (h’s range): Let h0 ∈ (0, k) be given. We evolve the ODEs (A.1)-(A.3)
from t = 0 to the right (t > 0). The local Lipschitz property of the ODEs ensure
that there exists a maximal interval of existence [0, τ) with τ ∈ (0,∞] by the Picard-
Lindelo¨f theorem (see, e.g., Theorem II.1.1 in Hartman 2002).
For a constant c, let Tf=c ∈ [0, τ ] be defined as
Tf=c := inf {t ∈ (0, τ) : f(t) = c} ∧ τ, (A.4)
where — as usual — the infimum over the empty set is defined as +∞. We define
Tg=c and Th=c similarly. Suppose that Tf=0 < τ . Then, f(0) = 1 and the continuity
of f imply that f(t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, Tf=0). Since f(Tf=0) = 0, we have f ′(Tf=0) ≤ 0,
but (A.2) implies f ′(Tf=0) = 1 > 0. Therefore, we conclude that
Tf=0 = τ and f(t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, τ). (A.5)
Because g(0) = 0 and g′(0) = aσ2D > 0, we have Tg=0 > 0 and g(t) > 0 for t ∈
(0, Tg=0). The ODE (A.1) with h(0) = h0 > 0 implies that h(t) increases on the
interval [0, Tg=0). Therefore, the ODE (A.2) and the positivity of (f, h) produce
f ′(t) > 1− f(t)C0, t ∈ [0, Tg=0). (A.6)
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Then, Gronwall’s inequality produces
f(t) ≥

1+(C0−1)e−C0t
C0
if C0 6= 0,
1 + t if C0 = 0.
(A.7)
This inequality implies that
f(t) ≥ C1 for t ∈ [0, Tg=0) where C1 :=
1, if C0 ≤ 1,1
C0
, if C0 > 1.
(A.8)
Suppose that Tg=0 < τ . Since g(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, Tg=0) and g(Tg=0) = 0, we
have g′(Tg=0) ≤ 0. However, this is a contradiction because (A.3) and (A.8) imply
g′(Tg=0) ≥ aσ2DC1 > 0 where the positive constant C1 is defined in (A.8).
Up to this point we have shown
Tg=0 = τ and

f(t) ≥ C1 > 0,
h(t) ≥ 0,
g(t) ≥ 0,
for t ∈ [0, τ). (A.9)
To proceed, the positive constant
C2 :=

−αC0
2
, if C0 < 0,
α
(
−C0+
√
C20+
4aσ2DC1
α
)
4
, if C0 ≥ 0
(A.10)
satisfies
− 2
α
x2 − C0x ≥ −aσ
2
DC1
2
for x ∈ [0, C2]. (A.11)
Because 0 ≤ g(t) < C2 for t ∈ [0, Tg=C2), we can bound (A.3) from below using (A.9)
and (A.11) to see for t ∈ [0, Tg=C2)
g′(t) ≥ aσ2DC1 −
2g(t)2
α
− g(t)C0
≥ 1
2
aσ2DC1.
(A.12)
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By integrating (A.12) and using the initial condition g(0) = 0 we see g(t) ≥ 1
2
aσ2DC1t
for t ∈ [0, Tg=C2). Therefore,
Tg=C2 ≤ 2C2aσ2DC1 . (A.13)
Suppose that Tg=C2 = τ . Then, for t ∈ [0, τ), we have 0 ≤ g(t) < C2 and the ODE
(A.1) produces
h′(t) ≤ 2C2
α
h(t),
h(t) ≤ h0 e
2C2
α
t,
(A.14)
where the second inequality uses Gronwall’s inequality. Similarly, for t ∈ [0, τ), the
ODE (A.2) and Gronwall’s inequality imply
f ′(t) ≤ 1 + f(t)
(
a2σ2D
2I
h(t) + |C0|
)
≤ 1 + f(t)
(
a2σ2Dh0
2I
e
2C2
α
t + |C0|
)
,
f(t) ≤ (1 + t) exp
(
|C0|t+ a
2σ2Dh0α
4IC2
(e
2C2
α
t − 1)
)
.
(A.15)
The boundedness properties g(t) < C2, (A.14), and (A.15) imply that h, f, and g do
not blow up for t finite. Then, Theorem II.3.1 in Hartman (2002) ensures τ = ∞
which contradicts (A.13). Consequently, we cannot have Tg=C2 = τ and it must be
the case that
Tg=C2 < τ. (A.16)
Let Tˆg=C2 be defined as the first time g reaches C2 strictly after time t = Tg=C2 ;
that is,
Tˆg=C2 := inf
{
t ∈ (Tg=C2 , τ) : g(t) = C2
} ∧ τ. (A.17)
Because g′(Tg=C2) ≥ aσ
2
DC1
2
> 0 by (A.12), we have
Tg=C2 < Tˆg=C2 and g(t) > C2 for t ∈ (Tg=C2 , Tˆg=C2). (A.18)
Suppose that Tˆg=C2 < τ . Then, g(Tˆg=C2) = C2 and (A.18) imply that g
′(Tˆg=C2) ≤ 0,
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but (A.3), (A.9), and (A.11) produce the contradiction:
g′(Tˆg=C2) = aσ
2
Df(Tˆg=C2)−
2C22
α
+ C2
(
a2σ2D
2I
h(Tˆg=C2)− C0
)
≥ aσ2DC1 −
2C22
α
− C2C0
≥ aσ2DC1
2
> 0.
(A.19)
Therefore, it must be the case that Tˆg=C2 = τ , which implies the lower bound
g(t) ≥ C2 > 0 for t ∈ [Tg=C2 , τ). (A.20)
Combining (A.12) and (A.20) gives the following global lower bound:
g(t) ≥ aσ2DC1
2
t ∧ C2 for t ∈ [0, τ). (A.21)
In turn, using the ODE (A.1), the bound (A.21) produces the global lower bound for
h via Gronwall’s inequality:
h(t) ≥ h0 exp
(
2
α
∫ t
0
aσ2DC1
2
s ∧ C2ds
)
for t ∈ [0, τ). (A.22)
Next, we suppose Th=k = τ . Then, for t ∈ [0, τ), we have 0 ≤ h(t) < k, and the
ODEs (A.2)-(A.3) and Gronwall’s inequality imply
f ′(t) ≤ 1 + f(t)C3,
f(t) ≤ (1 + t)eC3t,
g′(t) ≤ aσ2Df(t) + g(t)C3
≤ aσ2D(1 + t)eC3t + g(t)C3,
g(t) ≤ aσ2DeC3t(t+ 12t2),
(A.23)
where C3 :=
a2σ2D
2I
k+|C0|. The inequalities in (A.23) and 0 ≤ h(t) ≤ k imply that h, f,
and g do not blow up for t finite. Then, Theorem II.3.1 in Hartman (2002) ensures
τ = Th=k =∞. This is a contradiction because (A.22) implies that h(t) reaches k in
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finite time. Therefore, it must be the case that
Th=k < τ. (A.24)
Step 2/3 (Monotonicity): Let 0 < h0 < h˜0 < k, and denote the solution of the
ODE system (A.1)-(A.3) with the initial condition h(0) = h˜0 by f˜ , h˜, and g˜. The
corresponding maximal existence interval is denoted by τ˜ . We define Tg=g˜ as
Tg=g˜ := inf {t ∈ (0, τ ∧ τ˜) : g(t) = g˜(t)} ∧ τ ∧ τ˜ . (A.25)
Because g(0) = g˜(0) = 0, the ODEs (A.1)-(A.3) have the properties g′(0) = g˜′(0) =
aσ2D and
g′′(0) = aσ2D
(
1 +
a2σ2D
I
h0 − 2C0
)
< aσ2D
(
1 +
a2σ2D
I
h˜0 − 2C0
)
= g˜′′(0).
Therefore,
0 < g(t) < g˜(t) for t ∈ (0, Tg=g˜). (A.26)
Suppose that Tg=g˜ < τ ∧ τ˜ . The inequality (A.26) and the ODEs (A.1) and (A.2)
imply that h(t) < h˜(t)f(t) < f˜(t) for t ∈ (0, Tg=g˜]. (A.27)
Also, (A.26) and g(Tg=g˜) = g˜(Tg=g˜) produce g
′(Tg=g˜) ≥ g˜′(Tg=g˜). However, this
contradicts
g′(Tg=g˜) = aσ2Df(Tg=g˜)−
2g(Tg=g˜)
2
α
+ g(Tg=g˜)
(
a2σ2D
2I
h(Tg=g˜)− C0
)
< aσ2Df˜(Tg=g˜)−
2g˜(Tg=g˜)
2
α
+ g˜(Tg=g˜)
(
a2σ2D
2I
h˜(Tg=g˜)− C0
)
= g˜′(Tg=g˜),
(A.28)
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where we used (A.3) and (A.27). Therefore, we conclude that Tg=g˜ = τ ∧ τ˜ and
h(t) < h˜(t)
f(t) < f˜(t)
g(t) < g˜(t)
for t ∈ (0, τ ∧ τ˜). (A.29)
Step 3/3 (Existence): To emphasize the dependence on the initial condition h(0) =
h0, we write τ(h0) and Th=k(h0). For example,
Th=k(h0) := inf
{
t ∈ (0, τ(h0)) : h(t) = k} ∧ τ(h0). (A.30)
Inequality (A.24) in Step 1 implies that Th=k(h0) <∞ for h0 ∈ (0, k). Step 2 implies
that the map (0, k) 3 h0 7→ Th=k(h0) is strictly decreasing. Therefore, the following
three statements and the Intermediate Value Theorem complete the proof in the
sense that we can choose a unique hˆ0 ∈ (0, k) such that Th=k(hˆ0) = T (recall that
T ∈ (0,∞) is the model time horizon):
(i) limh0↑k Th=k(h0) = 0.
(ii) limh0↓0 Th=k(h0) =∞.
(iii) The map (0, k) 3 h0 7→ Th=k(h0) is continuous.
Here are the proofs of these three statements:
(i) Inequality (A.22) implies (i).
(ii) The inequalities in (A.23) and Gronwall’s inequality produce
h(t) = h0 exp
(∫ t
0
2g(s)
α
ds
)
≤ h0 exp
(∫ t
0
2aσ2De
C3s(s+
1
2
s2)
α
ds
)
.
(A.31)
Obviously, the function [0,∞) 3 t→ exp ( ∫ t
0
2aσ2De
C3s(s+
1
2
s2)
α
ds
)
is increasing. There-
fore, for any t0 > 0, we can choose h0 > 0 such that
h0 < k exp
(
−
∫ t
0
2aσ2De
C3s(s+
1
2
s2)
α
ds
)
, t ∈ [0, t0],
35
and use (A.31) to see Th=k(h0) > t0. This shows (ii).
(iii) Let h0 ∈ (0, k) be fixed. To emphasize the dependence on the initial condi-
tion, we write
(
h(t), g(t)
)
as
(
h(t, h0), g(t, h0)
)
. The local Lipschitz structure of the
ODEs (A.1)-(A.3) gives us the continuous dependence of their solutions on the initial
condition h0 (see, e.g., Theorem V.2.1 in Hartman 2002); that is,
lim
x→h0
h(t, x) = h(t, h0), t ∈
[
0, τ(h0)
)
. (A.32)
For 0 < x < h0 we have Th=k(h0) < Th=k(x), and the ODE (A.1) and the Funda-
mental Theorem of Calculus produce:
k = h
(
Th=k(x), x
)
= h
(
Th=k(h0), x
)
+
∫ Th=k(x)
Th=k(h0)
∂
∂t
h(t, x)dt
= h
(
Th=k(h0), x
)
+
2
α
∫ Th=k(x)
Th=k(h0)
g(t, x)h(t, x)dt
≥ h(Th=k(h0), x)+ 2x
α
∫ Th=k(x)
Th=k(h0)
(aσ2DC1
2
t ∧ C2
)
e
2
α
∫ t
0
aσ2DC1
2
s∧C2dsdt
≥ h(Th=k(h0), x)+ xC4(Th=k(x)− Th=k(h0)),
(A.33)
where the second last line uses the bounds (A.21) and (A.22) and C4 > 0 is an
irrelevant constant independent of x. Letting x ↑ h0 and using (A.32) produce
lim
x↑h0
Th=k(x) ≤ Th=k(h0). (A.34)
The opposite inequality trivially holds because Th=k(x) is strictly decreasing. There-
fore, (A.34) holds with equality. Similarly, for x ∈ (h0, k+h02 ), we have Th=k(k+h02 ) <
Th=k(x) < Th=k(h0) and
h
(
Th=k(h0), x
)
= h
(
Th=k(x), x
)
+
∫ Th=k(h0)
Th=k(x)
∂
∂t
h(t, x)dt
= k +
∫ Th=k(h0)
Th=k(x)
g(t, x)h(t, x)dt
≥ k + xC5
(
Th=k(h0)− Th=k(x)
)
,
(A.35)
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for a constant C5 independent of x. Letting x ↓ h0 and using (A.32) produce
lim
x↓h0
Th=k(x) ≥ Th=k(h0). (A.36)
Again, the opposite inequality trivially holds because Th=k(x) is strictly decreasing.
Therefore, (A.36) holds with equality and the continuity property follows.
♦
Proposition A.2. Let h0 = 0 in (A.1). Then, the ODEs (A.1)-(A.3) have unique
solutions on t ∈ [0,∞) with h(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition A.1, denote the maximal interval of existence
by (0, τ) for τ ∈ (0,∞]. For t ∈ [0, τ), the solutions to (A.1) and (A.2) are
h(t) = 0,
f(t) =

1+(C0−1)e−C0t
C0
if C0 6= 0
1 + t if C0 = 0
.
(A.37)
As in the proof of Proposition A.1, we can check that
g(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0, τ). (A.38)
Then (A.3), (A.37), and (A.38) imply that for t ∈ [0, τ),
g′(t) = aσ2Df(t)− 2g(t)
2
α
− C0g(t)
≤ aσ2Df(t) + αC
2
0
8
.
(A.39)
Gronwall’s inequality implies that g cannot blow up in finite time. Therefore, we
conclude that τ =∞.
♦
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B Proof of Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.3
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We prove that the coupled ODEs (3.1), (3.2), and (3.5) have
unique solutions for t ∈ [0, T ]. We apply Proposition A.1 and Proposition A.2 with
C0 := δ − a(−2LµD − 2IµY + 2aLρσDσY + aIσ
2
Y )
2I
− a
2σ2DL
2
2I2
,
k :=
I∑
i=1
θ2i,0 −
L2
I
,
(B.1)
where k is non-negative by Cauchy-Schwartz’s inequality. The functions
ψ(t) := h(T − t) + L2
I
, F (t) := f(T − t), Q22(t) := − g(T − t)
f(T − t) , (B.2)
solve (3.1), (3.2), and (3.5) for t ∈ [0, T ].
From (A.8) in the proof of Proposition A.1, we know that f(t) is bounded away
from zero for t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, the solutions to the linear ODEs for Q(t) and
Q2(t) in (3.3) and (3.4) can be found by integration.
♦
Proof of Theorem 3.3.
Step 1/2 (Individual optimality): In this step, we define the function
v(t,Mi, D, θi, Yi) := e
−a
(
Mi
F (t)
+Dθi+Yi+Q(t)+Q2(t)θi+
1
2
Q22(t)θ2i
)
, (B.3)
for t ∈ [0, T ] and Mi, D, θi, Yi ∈ R. In (B.3), the deterministic functions are defined
in (3.2)-(3.5). We note the terminal ODE conditions produce
v(T,Mi, D, θi, Yi) = e
−a(Mi+Dθi+Yi). (B.4)
Consequently, because Si,T = DT , we have
e−δTv(T,Mi,T , DT , θi,T , Yi,T ) = e−a(Xi,T+Yi,T )−δT , (B.5)
which is the terminal condition in (2.10). Next, we show that the function e−δtv with
v defined in (B.3) is the value function for (2.10). To see this, let (θ′i, ci) ∈ A be
38
arbitrary. Itoˆ’s lemma shows that the process e−δtv +
∫ t
0
e−aci,u−δudu — with v being
shorthand notation for the process v(t,Mi,t, Dt, θi,t, Yi,t) — has dynamics
d
(
e−δtv
)
+ e−aci,t−δtdt
= e−δtv
(
ea(−ci,t+Dtθi,t+
Mi,t
F (t)
+Q(t)+θi,tQ2(t)+
1
2
θ2i,tQ22(t)+Y )
− −aα(θ
′
i,t)
2−aci,t+aDtθi,t+aQ(t)+aθi,tQ2(t)+ 12aθ2i,tQ22(t)+aY−log( 1F (t))+1
F (t)
+
aF (t)Q22(t)2(L−θi,tI)2
αI2
− aMi,t
F (t)2
+
2aθ′i,tQ22(t)(L−θi,tI)
I
)
dt
− ae−δtv
(
θi,tσDdBt + σY
(
ρdBt +
√
1− ρ2dWi,t
))
,
(B.6)
where we have used the ODEs (3.1)-(3.5) and the interest rate (3.11). The local
martingale on the last line in (B.6) can be upgraded to a martingale. To see this, we
note that θi,t is bounded and v is square integrable by (2.9) so we can use Cauchy-
Schwartz’s inequality to obtain the needed integrability. Furthermore, to see that
the drift in (B.6) is non-negative, we note the second-order conditions for the HJB
equation are (there are no cross terms)
θ′i,t :
aα
F (t)
> 0,
ci,t : a
2e−aci,t > 0.
(B.7)
This first inequality in (B.7) holds because F (t) in (3.2) is the annuity (> 0). Conse-
quently, the drift in (B.6) is minimized to zero by the controls (3.13) and (3.14). This
implies that e−δtv +
∫ t
0
e−aci,u−δudu is a submartingale for all admissible order-rate
and consumption processes θ′i,t and ci,t.
It remains to verify admissibility of the controls (3.13) and (3.14). The explicit
solution (3.15) is deterministic and uniformly bounded. Inserting the controls (3.13)
and (3.14) into the money market account balance dynamics (2.16) produces
dMi,t =
(
r(t)Mi,t + θˆi,tDt − Sˆtθˆ′i,t + (Yi,t − cˆi,t)
)
dt
=
( log( 1
F (t)
)
a
+Mi,t
(
r(t)− 1
F (t)
)−Q(t)
− 1
2
θˆi,t
(
2Q2(t) + θˆi,tQ22(t)
)− Sˆtθˆ′i,t)dt.
(B.8)
The linear SDE (B.8) has a unique well-defined (Gaussian) solution that satisfies
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(2.9). All in all, this shows the admissibility requirements in Definition 2.1 and,
hence, optimality of (3.13) and (3.14) follows from the martingale property of e−δtv+∫ t
0
e−acˆi,u−δudu.
Step 2/2 (Clearing): Clearly, summing the optimal orders in (3.13) and using∑I
i=1 θi,0 = L show that the stock market clears for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Summing (3.14)
gives us
I∑
i=1
cˆi,t = I
log
(
F (t)
)
a
+DtL+ IQ(t) + LQ2(t) +
1
2
Q22(t)
I∑
i=1
θˆ2i,t +
I∑
i=1
Yi,t. (B.9)
Because ψ(0) =
∑I
i=1 θ
2
i,0 and
∑I
i=1 θˆ
2
i,t satisfies the ODE (3.1), we have ψ(t) =∑I
i=1 θˆ
2
i,t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, the real good market clears if and and only if
0 = I
log
(
F (t)
)
a
+ IQ(t) + LQ2(t) +
1
2
Q22(t)ψ(t). (B.10)
The terminal conditions in the ODEs (3.3)-(3.5) ensure clearing holds at time t = T .
By computing time derivatives in (B.10) and using r(t) defined in (3.11), we see that
clearing holds for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Finally, the terminal stock-price condition (2.3) for the equilibrium stock-price
process Sˆt in (3.12) holds by the terminal conditions in the ODEs (3.2), (3.4), and
(3.5).
♦
C Competitive Radner equilibrium
Theorem 2 in Christensen, Larsen, and Munk (2012) shows that there exists a com-
petitive Radner equilibrium in which the equilibrium interest rate is given by
rRadner = δ +
a
I
(LµD + IµY )− 1
2
a2
I2
(
I2σ2Y + 2ILρσDσY + L
2σ2D
)
, (C.1)
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and the equilibrium stock-price process is given by
SRadnert =
(rRadner − 1)erRadner(t−T ) + 1
rRadner
Dt
−
(
er
Radner(t−T )((rRadner−1)rRadner(t−T )+1)−1
)(
µD−aσDI (IρσY +LσD)
)
(rRadner)2
.
(C.2)
Itoˆ’s lemma and (C.2) produce the competitive Radner equilibrium stock-price volatil-
ity coefficient of SRadnert to be
(rRadner − 1)erRadner(t−T ) + 1
rRadner
σD. (C.3)
Equivalently, we can write (C.3) as FRadner(t)σD where the Radner annuity F
Radner(t)
is given by (4.3).
D Pareto efficient equilibrium
The following analysis uses the C-CAPM analysis from Breeden (1979). The utilities
(2.10) produce the representative agent’s utility function as
−e−aI c−δt, c ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T ]. (D.1)
Because the economy’s aggregate consumption is LDt+
∑I
i=1 Yi,t, the Pareto efficient
equilibrium model’s unique state-price density ξPareto = (ξParetot )t∈[0,T ] is proportional
to the process
e−
a
I
(LDt+
∑I
i=1 Yi,t)−δt, t ∈ [0, T ]. (D.2)
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Itoˆ’s lemma produces the relative state-price dynamics to be:
dξParetot
ξParetot
= −δdt− a
I
(
LdDt +
I∑
i=1
dYi,t
)
+
1
2
a2
I2
d〈LD +
I∑
i=1
Yi〉t
= −δdt− a
I
(
(LµD + IµY )dt+ (LσD + IσY ρ)dBt + σY
√
1− ρ2
I∑
i=1
dWi,t
)
+
1
2
a2
I2
(
(LσD + IσY ρ)
2 + Iσ2Y (1− ρ2)
)
dt.
(D.3)
From (D.3), the Pareto efficient equilibrium’s interest rate (i.e., the dt term in−dξParetot
ξParetot
)
and the market price of risk related to the Brownian motion Bt (i.e., the dBt volatility
term in −dξParetot
ξParetot
) are
rPareto = δ +
a
I
(LµD + IµY )− 1
2
a2
I2
(
(LσD + IσY ρ)
2 + Iσ2Y (1− ρ2)
)
,
λ =
a
I
(LσD + IσY ρ).
(D.4)
In turn, (D.4) produces the stock-price process in the Pareto efficient equilibrium to
be
SParetot =
1
ξParetot
Et
[ ∫ T
t
Duξ
Pareto
u du+DT ξ
Pareto
T
]
= −
(
er
Pareto(t−T )((rPareto−1)rPareto(t−T )+1)−1
)(
µD−aσDI (IρσY +LσD)
)
(rPareto)2
+ (r
Pareto−1)erPareto(t−T )+1
rPareto
Dt.
(D.5)
Itoˆ’s lemma and (D.5) produce the Pareto efficient equilibrium stock-price volatility
coefficient of SParetot to be
(rPareto − 1)erPareto(t−T ) + 1
rPareto
σD. (D.6)
Equivalently, we can write (D.6) as FPareto(t)σD where the annuity F
Pareto(t) is given
by (4.4).
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E Transitory Price-Impact Calibration
The challenge in calibrating the transitory price-impact parameter α in (3.10) is that,
α in our model is a measure of the perceived price-impact of fundamental trading im-
balances for the aggregate stock market due to frictions in accessing asset-holding ca-
pacity from other natural end-counterparties (e.g., large pensions and mutual funds)
and not transactional bid-ask bounce and market-maker inventory effects. In contrast,
most empirical research measures transitory price effects for individual orders for in-
dividual stocks (e.g., as in Hasbrouck (1991) and Hendershott and Menkveld (2014)).
The two concepts are related but there are some differences: First, α represents the
transitory price effects of sustained trading programs associated with underlying par-
ent orders rather than with isolated child orders (see, e.g., O’Hara (2015)) and one-off
single orders. Second, sustained trading occurs in practice both via liquidity-making
limit orders as well as via liquidity-taking market orders. From a transactional per-
spective, market and limit orders have opposite prices of liquidity since one is paying
for liquidity and the other is being compensated for providing liquidity. However,
limit buying and market buying both create fundamental asset-holding pressure on
the available ultimate (i.e., non-market-maker) asset sellers. It is the latter that α
measures in our model. Third, stock in our model represents the aggregate stock
market as an asset class and, thus, differs from individual stocks both in terms of its
scale and as being a source of systematic risk rather than also including idiosyncratic
stock-specific randomness. As a result, it seems natural, for example, to measure
aggregate trading imbalances relative to market capitalization (as a measure of fun-
damental distortions in aggregate asset supply and demand) rather than in terms of
shares (as in a transactional market-maker inventory model).
Our calibration involves adjusting empirical estimates of transitory price-impact
for individual stocks into an estimate of the transitory price-impact of trading demand
imbalances for the aggregate market. We proceed as follows: First, rather than
using price-impact measures for individual trades (e.g., as in Hasbrouck (1991)) or
market-maker inventory changes (e.g., as in Hendershott and Menkveld (2014)), we
use estimates of the daily transitory price-impact of parent orders in Almgren, Thum,
Hauptmann, and Li (2005). One advantage of the Almgren et al. (2005) estimation
for our purposes is that it measures transitory price-impacts at the parent order level
rather than at the child order level. Another advantage is that there is a natural way
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to rescale estimated transitory price-impact for individual stocks into a price-impact
for the aggregate market. In particular, the Almgren et al. (2005) estimation is an
industry-standard approach in which daily price-impact is estimated given panel data
for a sample of parent orders over time for a cross-section of actively traded stocks.
In doing so, the transitory price-impact (TPI) is scaled relative to a stock’s individual
price and daily return volatility and by scaling the underlying parent order size ∆θ
as a percentage relative to a stock’s average daily trading volume (ADV):
TPI
stock price× daily stock return volatility = η ×
( ∆θ
ADV
× 100
)β
. (E.1)
The coefficient η is estimated in Almgren et al. (2005) to be 0.141, and the exponent β
is estimated to be 0.6 (i.e., slightly larger than the standard square-root model). One
final advantage is that these estimates are average effects for all stocks rather than
being driven by stock-specific differences in the trading environment for a particular
stock (e.g., price level, bid-ask spread, institutional vs. retail ownership, market-
maker inventory risk due to idiosyncratic stock returns). This gives a “dimensionless”
standardized measure of transitory price-impact that can then be rescaled for the
aggregate market.
Hence, a preliminary estimate of α in our model is:
TPI ≈ market value× daily market return volatility× η × Q
β
3 −Qβ1
Q3 −Q1 ×
SO
ADV
× 100
L
× θ
′
i
265
≈ 3.5× 0.2
√
1
265
× 0.141× 1.36
0.6 − 0.380.6
1.36− 0.38 × 121.36×
100
100
× θ
′
i
265
≈ 0.0018× θ′i.
(E.2)
The following steps were used to derive (E.2): First, the market value ($3.50) is set so
that the calibrated absolute (dollar) price-impact is roughly consistent with the stock
prices our asset-pricing model produces. Second, the daily return volatility is set to
a ballpark 20% annual return volatility for the aggregate stock market deannualized
for one trading day. Third, the power function in (E.1) is linearized using its slope
between the empirical interquartile values Q1 and Q3 reported in Almgren et al (2005)
for the percentage parent-size/ADV ratio. Fourth, the ratio ∆θ
ADV
is factored for our
model as SO
ADV
∆θ
SO
= 121.36∆θ
L
where 121.36 is the empirical average ratio of shares
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outstanding to ADV for the NYSE and Nasdaq for 2009-2018,10 and where shares
outstanding SO = L = 100 in our model. This rescaling measures parent order size
relative to shares outstanding, which, as discussed above, is a natural measure of
trade size in our asset-pricing model. Fifth, the parameter α in (3.10) in our model
measures the transitory price-impact relative to the trading rate θ′i,t (i.e., where θ
′
i,tdt
is the instantaneous child order flow). Thus, we write the daily parent order ∆θ as
∆θ =
∫ 1
265
0
θ′idt = θ
′
i
1
265
(E.3)
in terms of a constant child flow rate θ′i over a trading day (i.e.,
1
265
of a year).
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